Introduction
This article examines the legacy of post-development theory, in particular its relevance and applicability to debates about Africa's future. Post-colonial Africa's marginal position in the global economy and international system of states 1 , combined with the propensity of orthodox development scholars to graft an essentially Western modernisation trajectory onto blueprints for socio-economic development in Africa 2 , ought to have made the continent a fertile target for heterodox scholars considering alternatives forms of development and even alternatives to development. As pointed out by Matthews in one of the key contributions to post-development theory in Africa, 'many of the factors that led to the disillusionment of post-development theorists are prominent in Africa'. 3 Nevertheless she also makes it clear that 'post-development has had little to say about Africa'. 4 Indeed, it is not clear whether post-development theory and attendant societal critiques of development that proliferated in the last few decades of the twentieth century have had any lasting effect on how development is pursued in twenty-first century Africa.
To evaluate this question of post-development theory's legacy and its relevance to contemporary Africa, the article examines what lessons can be drawn by scrutinising post-development theory, and its claims about the end of development, through the prisms of Africa's pursuit of development and its political economy of energy. It considers the impact of these aspects of Africa's continued developmental efforts on the ability of post-development theory to provide insights into recent developments, such as the ideational and normative ramifications of pursuing socioeconomic development by means of an intensifying exploitation of Africa's fossil fuels in the current context of an increasing emphasis globally on renewable sources of energy and a transition to a low carbon economy. Revisiting basic claims of postdevelopment theory provides insights into the enduring disconnect and incommensurability between Africa's twenty-first century socio-economic trajectories and the core assumptions of post-development theory.
Development, exhausted and rejuvenated
The body of scholarship referred to as post-development theory constitutes the most fundamental critique and, for some of its adherents, total rejection of the modern notion of development as it emerged and became concretised in various policies and projects in the decades following World War II. 5 Ziai identifies two main strands of post-development theory: a 'sceptical' one and a 'neo-populist' one. Neo-populism constitutes a more sweeping critique that is essentially 'anti-development' and prone to romanticise tradition and community. The 'sceptical' approach entails a more nuanced criticism commensurate with the emergence of a 'radical democratic' approach to development studies, wherein criticism of development recognises the political and economic power structures within which any fruitful debate on radical alternatives to the status quo must be located. 6 The 'neo-populist' strand corresponds largely to what Simon describes as 'anti-development'. 7 While the developments and trajectories identified in this article can more straightforwardly contribute to a refutation of the core claims of anti-development, they pose, as recently argued by The opening declaration of Sachs's Development Dictionary in 1992 asserted that the era of development, predicated on modernisation by means of deepening the structures of capitalism including global economic integration, had proven itself unable to deliver the growing populations of the formerly colonised world from exploitation, poverty and related hardships. 9 There had been, echoing Heilbroner's memorable phrase, no 'great ascent' of Empire's downtrodden 10 , but rather what Pritchett a few decades later described as 'divergence, big time' between Global North and South. 11 Nowhere, it seemed, was that failure more pronounced than in Africa. The colonial history of Africa was one in which the continent's many misfortunes (oftentimes external in origin) have been combined and utilised by imperial rulers and scholars alike to produce a view of the continent as essentially inadequate, a place of systemic failure in terms of its ability to engage with and partake in the modern world. 12 Despite rhetorical shifts in the post-colonial era, the core aspects of this Western view on Africa persisted and seemed also vindicated by empirical evidence. In her recent re-examination of post-development theory in Africa, Matthews provides several illustration of a persistent 'desirability of development' across the continent. 32 It is a continent exemplified by the aspirations of 'modern man', who embraces rather than rejects the basic components of development and which therefore casts doubt on the more strident of post-development theory's assumptions about 'what people want' in developing regions (i.e., the supposed rejection of pursuing greater economic growth and material affluence in favour of non-material and non-economic measures of well-being). Matthews identifies the high-profile case of 'service delivery protests' in South Africa as an example. These protests, very much driven by grassroots agency, are directed against the state's failure to deliver basic conditions associated with development -from access to flushing toilets to decent housing and jobs -and not against the notion of development itself. 33 Critically, she argues that post-development theorists have failed to understand the degree to which conventional notions of development became vested with notions of justice and redress -i.e., the very desirability of development which is by some development critics all too easily dismissed simply a matter of African minds still being colonised. 34 Having access to basic material necessities goes to the heart of human dignity, and the lack of such access remains a daily reminder of a previous colonial condition that gave rise to the current inequality in access in the first place.
That such commitments to development are evident across the Global South does not necessarily mean that post-development theory amounts to a failed intellectual project. But it does tell us something important about the resilience of development defined as modernisation, and about the challenges with which twentyfirst century post-development theorist must contend: emerging and complex forms of modernity that retain and reanimate tradition in ways not easily accommodated by post-development theory, 35 as well as resilient popular support, including in traditional communities, for orthodox manifestations of development 36 -truly an elusive yet formidable hydra to be confronted by the post-development sceptic.
Thus Sachs's assertion that '[t]he idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape' is hardly the view of development suggested by Africa's twenty-first century trajectory. 37 Nor does his claim, that the idea of development has become 'outdated' and that, 'above all, the hopes and desires which made the idea fly, are now exhausted', seem plausible today. 38 This is perhaps the most exaggerated statement in Sachs's and his fellow theorists' obituary for the Era of Development when judging it from the perspective of social and political developments in Africa today. The track record of development actors, including governments, development agencies and the 'NGO industry', has certainly been criticised. 39 But the notion of a project that is exhausted seems an assertion too far.
A rather troubling conceptualisation of development is inherent in this particular account. There seems to be something aloof, even dismissive, inherent in the idea that development has, in Sachs's words, merely 'eliminated innumerable varieties of being human and have turned the world into a place deprived of adventure and surprise'. 40 There are presumably some forms of 'adventure and surprise' that those who are coping with dire poverty might conceivably want to trade for comfort and predictability. In this sense, post-development becomes susceptible to what
Corbridge referred to as 'wobbly romanticism' -'only the rich get lonely, only the poor live hospitably and harmoniously' -and 'implausible politics' -'we can all live like the Mahatma, or would want to'. 41 We may be concerned about some manifestations and consequences of modernity in materially wealthy societies, but it was not only life outside society that, in Hobbes' vivid characterisation, was 'nasty, brutish and short'. That remains for many an apt description of life below the poverty line today.
Africa Rising, and falling
In contrast to the expectations embodied in the Development Dictionary and corresponding critiques of development, the twenty-first century saw the emergence of a rather more promising socio-economic trajectory of sustained economic growth across most of Africa, even if the World Bank points out that Africa's economic diversification was rather modest and vulnerability to swings in commodity prices remained high. 42 onwards. Combined with a failure to turn sustained economic growth into significant diversification of national economies, the sharp loss of export earnings for Africa's many commodity-dependent economies, and in particular the oil-exporting ones, has become a serious threat to the continent's overall economic progress. 47 Thus another false start, another vindication of 'Afro-pessimism' -the tortuous trajectory of postcolonial Africa's economic woes reasserting itself yet again. 48 Dismissing the idea of Africa Rising as lacking in substance, Taylor argues that we are instead witnessing a case of 'dependency redux' as the economic foundations of this success story are in fact much weaker than assumed:
[T]he story of 'Africa Rising' is just that, a story, where growth-for-growth's sake replaces development and the agenda of industrialisation and moving Africa up the global production chain has been discarded. Instead, Africa's current 'comparative advantage' as a primary commodity exporter is reinforced, even whilst such dynamics reproduce underdevelopment. This is celebrated as 'progress'. 49 This, then, are two tales of Africa: rising and falling. The question is whether
Africa's post-colonial crises can ever been transcended by means of orthodox development, or whether this promise is bound to remain what Rahnema insisted was merely a 'deceitful mirage'? 50 Pursuing development seems, however, the course that most African countries will choose to stay. Young argues that Africa's post-colonial state has been consigned to history, as of the 1990s 'eviscerated' by the combined forces of economic decline and market reform. 51 Africans have ever since been forging their own identities and shaping their own goals, the colonial shadow ever receding. Those goals, however, remain remarkably well aligned with exogenous models of development on offer from the West and the rising powers of the Global South. The global system is in transition, but in some ways it also remains more stable and resilient than anticipated in terms of asymmetrical relations between its more and less powerful actors. African states and related actors remain marginalised in the international system, but also determined to improve their situation within that system as currently constituted rather than seeking to radically depart from it. 52 The political economy of energy is one area that can provide useful insights into this determination.
Fossil-fuelled development
The question of energy, how to obtain it and how to use it, is inextricably intertwined with the notion of modernisation and development. That is, to develop is to exploit, to produce and to consume. In order to do all of these things energy is (along with finance/credit) one of the indispensable ingredients of sustaining and reproducing the modern world -what Di Muzio aptly describes as our 'petro-market civilisation'. 53 In their introduction to Energy, Capitalism and World Order, Di Muzio and Ovadia explain how the harnessing of fossil fuels make possible the emergence of modern, industrial civilisation. 54 Previously, in the 'age of efflorescences', 55 civilizations were more immediately tied to the rhythms of plant photosynthesis and the power of wind, water, animals and unfree labour… what we would today call 'economic growth' could flourish from time to time but was never sustained. 56 In Carbon Democracy, Mitchell takes this argument further to show that twentieth-century modern democracy, via the power of organised labour, grows out of the coal-based fossil fuel economy. 57 Fossil fuel-based energy has been the ultimate enabler of modernity, and no other endeavour symbolises the desire for development more than does the craving for energy. There is furthermore a strong correlation between energy usage and mainstream indicators of improvements in living circumstances, such as the UN's Human Development Index (HDI). 58 
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In this context, then, the fact that there has emerged a big and very costly gap between demand and supply of energy in Africa becomes particularly relevant.
McDonald demonstrates that,
Africa is the most under-supplied region in the world when it comes to electricity, but its economies are utterly dependent on it. This contradiction is explained in part by the enormous inequalities in electricity access, with mining and industry receiving abundant supplies of cheap power whilst more than 80 percent of the continent's residents remain off the power grid. 59 Kessides estimates that 25 of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing 'crippling' shortages of electricity and regular blackouts, resulting in a loss of 2.1% of the region's GDP. 60 Mohammed, Mustafa and Bashir argue that 'access to modern energy is considered one of the foremost factors contributing to the disparity between developed and developing nations'. 61 This, according to McDonald, is the inevitable outcome of what he terms 'electric capitalism'. 62 Electricity is 'an integral part of all capitalist activity', and since (especially southern) African economies are very electricity-intensive, with ambitious plans to massively increase electricity-generation capacity, the development of electricity markets, and energy markets generally, becomes a particularly useful way to understand broader dynamics of 'capitalist accumulation and crisis' on the continent. 63 As but one example, the path-dependent nature of South Africa's energy-intensive and dependent economy, and the difficulties in producing concrete alternatives to it given its strong anchoring in the power structures of the state, has been outlined by Fine In this context, intensifying efforts by African governments and energy companies in collaboration with international energy companies to exploit the continent's energy resources, and in particular its oil and natural gas deposits, 67 are a testament to the enduring determination by governments and businesses to achieve development by means of modernisation. The primary goal across Africa's energyrich states today is not how to phase out the reliance on fossil fuels but how to more effectively exploit them, even if in combination with developing renewable options.
As noted by Collier, the era of resource exploitation is nowhere near its end across the, when it comes to natural resources including fossil fuels, relatively underexplored and underdeveloped countries of the Global South. 68 Thus the political, economic and technocratic questions about bridging Africa's energy gap revolve primarily around how to fully embrace and constructively exploit Africa's resource wealth while at the same time avoiding the 'resource curse' that has afflicted Africa's oil producing countries in particular. 69 This, combined with a trajectory of increasing resource exploitation in the pursuit of economic growth and development, is as good an indicator as any of the lasting triumph of the Era of Development and the drive for modernisation. On all of these accounts, the African trajectory runs counter to the expectations of an exhausted development project as outlined in the first edition of Sachs's Development Dictionary and by postdevelopment theory more generally.
Turning development Green
It is by now also recognised that African countries will be among the ones most severely affected by climate change, which of course their own drives to industrialise and develop on the back of fossil fuels are contributing to. Consequently there are movements afoot across Africa whereby environmental groups, sometimes in collaboration with governments, push for a 'greener' future and are contributing to a reconfiguring the African state in the process. 70 A transition to renewable sources of energy is also modestly under way and might increase to contribute two-thirds of the growth in demand for power by 2020. 71 International agreements such as the one Countries. It does not include references to their special circumstances, is weak on international dimensions for adaptation policy, and precludes any future claims for liability and compensation. 73 But even allowing for a move towards a 'greening' of African economies, the core aims of orthodox development -notably the pursuit of economic growth and increasing market shares -remain in place. Considering the development of an ostensibly 'green economy' in South Africa, the continent's leader in renewable energy investments, Death argues that it is the decidedly liberal and market-driven discourse of 'green growth' that is being prioritised by South Africa's government:
'rather than a focus on limits and scarcity … the emphasis is on new markets, new services, and new forms of consumption'. 74 This growth model stands in stark contrast to other 'discourses' including what he terms a 'Green revolution', which entails a radical reconfiguration of economic activity to align with postdevelopmental concepts such as 'ecological virtues' and 'limits to growth', and 'Green transformation', which entails an 'explicit focus on social justice, equity and redistribution' where growth is a means rather than and end. 75 It is through focusing on South Africa's 'brand' as a rising power, with a youthful and energetic population and a rich natural environment, and the country as the economic and political 'gateway to Africa', rather than its environmental and social contradictions, that South African can be positioned as a global leader on the green economy. 76 China has emerged as a key contributor to rapidly increasing investments in renewables across the African continent (albeit from a very low base), especially in solar power and in particular in South Africa. 77 Shen and Power explain that Chinese energy companies have been 'pushed' into African markets 'by the need to deal with over-production, excess capacity and over-investment' at home. 78 In this case too, the main aim is to capture new markets and, by extension, offering alternative paths to socio-economic development. fossil fuels and achieving a low-carbon transition -granting that they should be successful (which remains is highly uncertain) -is manifestly not an attempt to find and offer alternatives to development as has been a primary ambition of the scholarly community of post-development theorists. Rather it is a move towards entrenching modernity across African societies by alternative means.
Conclusion: the legacy of post-development?
In the end we are, not surprisingly, left with a plethora of questions. While there is no scope to answer them all here, they are nevertheless worth acknowledging when considering the continued relevance of post-development theory for Africa and the Global South more generally. Just as Marx was long on the failings of capitalism but short on the nature of socialism, post-development theory is good at generating questions about development, but less prolific when it comes to identifying alternatives thereto. This is not necessarily a problem in itself, but it does mean that concluding thoughts on the legacy of post-development theory are inevitably going to be characterised by a degree of tentativeness.
What is the legacy of post-development theory, in Africa and across the Global South? Do the critiques of development as initially put forth by Sachs and colleagues stand vindicated? Do they have a future as meaningful, and effective, scholarly critiques of orthodox development thinking and practice? Can it be argued that, irrespective of whether or not concrete alternatives to development have been produced, post-development has nevertheless achieved a crucial intervention in the debates about development, thus forcing a change in the dominant development discourse by making it less replete with simplistic and taken-for-granted assumptions?
As noted by Escobar, one of the most prominent contributors to these debates, the discourses themselves really do matter. 80 Or is it, alternatively, the case that post-development has had its moment in the sun (or at least the seminar room), only to be eclipsed by subsequent economic developments and by an irrepressible belief in, and attraction to, development-as- South, and the very wealthy in the Western world), and losers (the very poorest across the Global South and the working and middle classes of the West) in a world of increasing economic globalisation. 84 It is therefore difficult to accept assertions such as those made by Andrews and Bawa, that globalisation is 'inherently bad for the poor'. 85 The existence of substantial numbers of winners, even among many losers, is furthermore significant because it makes a comprehensive, coherent and sustained challenge to the status quo on development that post-development theory aspires to that much more difficult and therefore unlikely.
So what do these developments entail for the legacy and continued relevance of post-development theory? It is evident that orthodox development strategies have produced significant winners across the Global South, if less so in Africa. This is the case even if development as conventionally understood and pursued will never become a panacea for all of the world's poor -neither perfect positive-sum game, nor inevitably zero-sum. To the extent that these beneficiaries of development gain a more prominent voice in public discourses and national politics across the world, including in Africa (even though the continent remains home to so many of those who
have not yet benefitted), we can expect that the ideational influence and normative power of development by means of economic growth and modernisation will remain an attractive proposal.
There are those who may find little hope in what is on offer and may therefore
give up on development, considering it the ultimate pretence and diversion in an unsustainable world. But the idea and promise of development retains for a vast majority of the world's population the potency it has acquired since the Enlightenment and industrial revolution. Indeed, Matthews begins her recent analysis of the relevance of post-development theory to Africa by acknowledging that Sachs, in the preface to the new edition of his Development Dictionary, now recognises that the Global South has become 'the staunchest defender of development'. 86 Indeed, he has come to recognise the extent to which the idea of development has 'been charged with hopes for redress and self-affirmation'. 87 This intertwining of the idea of development with desires for justice and improvement across the Global South is in line with the argument pursued throughout this article. Thus to offer something more appealing and attractive than what has manifestly become a primary pursuit of societies worldwide in the Era of Development remains the challenge for development's detractors.
